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ABSTRACT
Bank failures are widely feared for a number of reasons, including concern that depositors
may suffer both losses in the value of their deposits (credit losses) and, possibly more
importantly, restrictions in access to their deposits (liquidity losses).  In the United States, this
is not true for insured deposits, which are fully protected and made available to the depositor
almost immediately.  But both problems may occur for uninsured depositors.  Thus, there is
pressure on regulators to protect all depositors in bank failures.   This is likely to increase both
moral hazard risk-taking by banks and poor agency behavior by regulators with large ultimate
costs to taxpayers.  While ways of reducing the credit loss in bank failures have been widely
examined, reducing liquidity losses has received far less attention.  One way to mitigate this
loss to uninsured depositors is to make the estimated recovery value of their deposits quickly
available to them upon failure of the bank through an advance dividend or other payment by
the FDIC secured by the bank’s assets.  Quick depositor access was suggested as a superior
solution to deposit insurance in alleviating adverse effects from bank failures during the
debate on deposit insurance in the early 1900s and was actually put into effect by both the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New York State Banking Department shortly
before the establishment of the FDIC.  More recently, the FDIC has experimented with the
concept.  This paper analyzes the pros and cons of providing quick depositor access to
deposits at failed banks and reviews the history of the concept.  It concludes that such a policy
would greatly enhance the FDIC’s ability to resolve large bank insolvencies without having to
protect uninsured depositors through too-big-to-fail policies.
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I.   Introduction
Bank failures give rise to a number of widespread fears.  Among these is the fear of
depositors that, if uninsured, they may suffer losses in the current value of their deposits and
that, whether insured or not, they may not have full and immediate access to the current value
of their accounts so that their deposits are effectively frozen.      That is, depositors may suffer
a loss in credit value  (credit risk) and/or a loss in liquidity (liquidity risk).  Both conditions
represent a loss in depositor wealth.   The potential loss in credit value occurs if the market
value of the banks’ assets at the date of resolution (failure) is less than that of their deposits
and if additional losses are incurred during the resolution process.   The potential loss in
liquidity occurs if depositors at the failed bank may not access the full current value of their
funds after failure until the proceeds from the sale of the bank or its assets are distributed.
This loss may be divided into a time or present value loss of receiving a future rather than an
immediate payment of the same amount and, if an efficient secondary market for depositor
receivership claims does not exist, an additional illiquidity loss.
 1
                                                          
* Parts of this paper, particularly Section IV, draw on Kaufman and Seelig (2002).  I am indebted to Lee
Davidson (FDIC), Christian Johnson (Loyola University Chicago), Edward Kane (Boston College), Joseph
Mason (Drexel University), James Moser (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), Steven Seelig (IMF), Stanley
Silverberg, and participants at presentations at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Western Economic
Association for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts.  The views expressed in this paper are the author’s, and
should not be construed as positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
1  Restricted depositor access to their accounts is also common in many countries and historically in the United
States during a general banking crises to reduce large-scale conversion into specie or foreign currency, even if
the banks may be solvent, e.g., in the U.S. during the banking panics of 1893, 1907,  particularly 1933, when all
banks were effectively closed down for one week during a national “bank holiday” in March and some banks2
The reasons for the loss in credit value and ways of minimizing such losses through
both enhanced monitoring and disciplining by at-risk depositors and other bank creditors and
efficient closure rules by regulators have received considerable attention in the recent
literature (e.g., Benston and Kaufman, 1997 and 1998).  The potential loss in liquidity has
received substantially less attention, however, particularly in the United States where liquidity
risk has not been a major problem in recent years. Since the introduction of Federal Deposit
Insurance in 1934, effectively all depositors were fully protected immediately at large bank
failures and unprotected uninsured depositors in many smaller bank failures were provided
with immediate liquidity of the recovery value.  Nevertheless, liquidity risk in bank
resolutions has been considered a serious problem in the U.S. historically and remains a
serious problem in most other countries.  Indeed, in these countries loss of liquidity is often
perceived as a more frightening consequence of bank failures than the loss of value.  For
example, a European bank analyst has recently argued that
Likewise, the Swedish Central Bank has observed that
                                                                                                                                                                                     
longer, and in Argentina in 2002. If delays in asset sales result in obtaining a higher recovery value, credit but
not liquidity loss is reduced (Kaufman and Seelig, 2002).
The issue is not so much the fear of a domino effect where the
failure of a large bank would create the failure of many smaller
ones; strict analysis of counterparty exposures has reduced
substantially the risk of a domino effect.  The fear is rather that the
need to close a bank for several months to value its illiquid assets
would freeze a large part of deposits and savings, causing a
significant negative effect on national consumption (Dermine,
1996, p. 680).
Freezing a company’s assets and suspending its payments from
the time the bankruptcy order is issued could have serious
implications if applied to banks.  A bank’s liabilities do after all
form an active part of its business operations, and its borrowing
and interbank funding activities reflect among other things the
banks’ central role in the payment system.  Suddenly freezing the
repayment of liabilities at one or more big banks could have
immeasurable consequences for the banking system as a whole
(Viotti, 2000, p.55).3
In effect, short-term, liquid deposits are suddenly involuntarily transformed into long-term,
illiquid deposits.
2   Recently, Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2002) have found evidence that
delays in recovering the value of assets of failed banks in the 1930’s and in reimbursing the
depositors had strong and lasting effects on the persistence of the Great Depression in the U.S.
  Kaufman and Seelig (2002) note that, if there is a threat of serious loss of depositor
liquidity in bank failures, bank regulators come under intense pressure both from the
depositors and from macroeconomic policy-makers to keep the insolvent banks operating by
extending guarantees to some or all stakeholders, particularly if a large bank is failed or a
number of smaller banks are failed simultaneously so that the aggregate money supply may be
significantly diminished by the effective lengthening of the maturities of the deposits, Thus,
the ability and willingness of governments to quickly liquify deposits at failed banks, as well
as to keep deposit credit losses small through the appropriate implementation of prompt
corrective action and least  cost resolution strategies, significantly eases their ability to avoid
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or too-many-to-fail rescues of insolvent banks.  That is, avoiding or
minimizing depositor illiquidity at failed banks is a prerequisite for resolving insolvent banks
efficiently with loss sharing by at-risk depositors.
This paper discusses why and how a loss in depositor liquidity is generally not now a
major problem in the U.S., examines the history of earlier attempts to provide such liquidity
and reduce the severity of the problem, and reviews briefly on the status of the problem in
other countries.  The paper concludes that, because it can liquify quickly both insured and
uninsured deposits at failed banks, the U.S can resolve even large bank failures efficiently
                                                          
2 The greater fear of liquidity than credit loss is also apparent in the classic 1946 movie, “It’s a Wonder Life.”
The hero of the movie,  played by James Stewart, finds himself the operator of a small town building and loan
association that is experiencing a run because the town villain banker has called a loan to the association that has
absorbed all the association’s cash.  There is none left for the depositors.  The depositors are about to accept the
banker’s offer of 50 cents on the dollar, when Stewart, using currency his just-married wife had set aside for their
honeymoon, persuades the depositors to ask now only for the amounts they desperately needed immediately.
This turned out to be far less than 50 cents on the dollar.  But, as the cause is good, the depositors are satisfied
that they will be paid the rest later and return home.  The association and town are saved!4
without bailouts, but that the inability of most other countries to do so severely restricts their
ability to resolve their failed large banks without bailouts.
II. Current Treatment of Depositors in U.S.
When a bank is legally failed and resolved - - so that it is placed in receivership and
liquidated or reorganized and recapitalized with a change in control - -, depositors at domestic
offices of the bank have claims on the insurance agency equal to the par value of their
deposits up the maximum de jure insurance coverage and for amounts above this ceiling on
the designated bank receiver, generally the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
equal to the prorata share of the amount of funds recovered from the sale of the bank or its
assets.
3  In either case, the uninsured depositors (and other creditors) and the FDIC, which
stands in the shoes of the insured depositors, are entitled to the proceeds as they are collected
and distributed by the receiver.  The FDIC passes through the proceeds to the qualified
depositors.
But the asset sales may or may not occur concurrently with the date of failure of a
bank.  If the bank is sold as a whole on the date of failure, so that that all the assets and
deposits are completely assumed by another bank at par or the FDIC contributes sufficient
funding immediately to cover any lower asset value, all depositors have full and immediate
access to the par amount of their funds and there is no loss in liquidity.  But, if asset sales are
partially or totally delayed or distribution of funds to claimants are delayed, there is a
potential loss in liquidity to both insured and uninsured depositors.
However, although the FDIC may not obtain funds from the asset sales immediately,
unlike most other insurance companies, e.g., automobile or fire insurers, it attempts to pay the
insured deposits as promptly as possible to reduce depositor illiquidity.  It effectively
                                                          
3  Under the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, deposits at foreign offices of U.S. banks and unsecured nondeposit
funds at domestic offices are subordinated to deposits at domestic offices and are eligible for payment only after
domestic deposits have been paid in full.  Insured (FDIC) and uninsured deposits have equal priority.5
advances the insured depositors both the prorata estimated present value of the recovery
amount and the difference between the par value of the insured deposits and the recovery
amount.  The latter represents the insured credit loss.  Thus, these deposits do not experience a
significant liquidity loss.
To facilitate this policy, insured banks are currently generally failed and placed in
receivership on Thursdays or Fridays and the insured deposits made available close to the next
business day – Monday – either at the bank that assumed the deposits or at a designated
paying agent.  The weekend generally provides the FDIC with time to obtain information
from the failed bank’s records on the identification of the insured depositors and the amount
of the eligible insured deposits.  In most instances, additional time is provided as the FDIC is
notified by the bank’s primarily federal regulator when or before a bank becomes classified as
“critically under-capitalized” according to the tripwire definitions of prompt corrective action
under the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.
4  At this point, resolution is generally
required within 90 days, although extensions up to 270 days are permitted.  The FDIC
reimburses itself for the advances of the recovery amounts from the proceeds of the later asset
sales.  Errors in estimating the recovery amount effects only the size of the insurance loss, not
the size of the payments to insured depositors.
Uninsured depositor at failed banks are affected somewhat differently.  Before 1982, if
they were not fully protected, which they generally were through assisted merger with another
bank (purchase and assumption), so that their funds were fully and immediately available at
the assuming bank, uninsured depositors were provided a prorata claim (receivership
certificate) on the recovery proceeds above insured maximum and paid as the proceeds were
                                                          
4  The regulatory definition of capital for this determination is currently set at tangible book value of equity equal
to 2 percent of total on-balance sheet assets.  Although regulators can tighten this definition and may also declare
an institution insolvent if they determine the institution to be operating in an unsafe and unsound manner, banks
that are able to disguise their insolvent or near-insolvent economic condition through legal or fraudulent
overstating their assets or understating their losses (underreserving) or liabilities are frequently able to delay6
collected by the receiver.  In 1983, in order to enhance market discipline on banks by large
depositors, the FDIC attempted to put more of them at-risk and began to transfer only insured
deposits to assuming banks in full and to subject uninsured deposits to losses.  At the same
time, to reduce any loss in liquidity, the FDIC advanced payment to these depositors in
advance of collecting  recoveries from the sale of the bank or its assets equal to a conservative
estimate of the present value of the recovery amount.  These advance dividends on
receivership certificates were generally paid in the form of a deposit at the bank that also
assumed the uninsured (FDIC, 1983 and 1997).   The uninsured depositors also maintained a
claim on any recovery amounts in excess of the dividend, which was paid by the FDIC as
collected.  Any excess amount collect over the par value of these claims was paid to other
creditors and shareholders.  If, in retrospect, the FDIC overestimated the recovery amount
(underestimated the loss), it absorbed the loss.  It is interesting to note that when uninsured
deposits were fully and immediately protected, the depositors effectively also received an
advance dividend but equal to the par value of the deposits rather than a lesser amount.
The FDIC’s experiment with the new policy of loss-sharing was short-lived.  When
the first large money center bank – the Continental Illinois National Bank (Chicago), which
was the country’s seventh largest bank, – declined into insolvency in 1984, the FDIC
protected all depositors and other creditors at both the bank and its parent holding company
fully and immediately. (Belluck, 1984; Sprague, 1986; and Kaufman, 2002).  Thereafter
through 1991, it likewise protected almost all uninsured as well as all insured depositors at all
but a few small banks, where merger with another bank on an assisted basis was not feasible
because of restrictions on branching at the time or the assets were heavily impaired and
difficult to value (Kaufman, 2002).  It was not until after the enactment of FDICIA in 1991
that uninsured depositors were again effectively placed at risk at all banks and that the FDIC
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regulatory resolution.  Such delays effectively extend the legal time allowance for resolution and are likely to7
again paid advance dividends to uninsured domestic depositors in many failures where it was
able to make meaningful estimates of the recovery value.
5  
Similar to payments on insured deposits in all failures and on uninsured deposits in
failures in which these deposits are fully and immediately protected through assisted mergers,
advance dividends in failures in which uninsured deposits are not fully protected are generally
paid on Mondays, after the bank is failed on Fridays.  To protect the FDIC against loss, this
policy requires reasonably accurate estimates of the recovery value.  Additional time may be
necessary to do this and may require earlier notification to the FDIC of a pending
downgrading of a bank to critically undercapitalized by other regulators or delaying resolution
after a bank is so classified.  But, because this information is also required by the FDIC to
provide to potential bidders for the failed bank on a timely basis before resolution, the delay to
pay advance dividends generally should not greatly increase the total lead time necessary for
resolution of all but the largest banks.
However, Kaufman and Seelig (2002) note that liquifying deposit claims immediately
has disadvantage as well as advantages.  The major advantage is that, if the loss in credit value
is not overly large, it permits the FDIC to resolve even large banks with losses imposed on
uninsured deposits and other creditors. Political pressure from large depositors should be no
more intense than from creditors suffering similar size losses from the failure of any large
firm.  These depositors are able to view their deposits as similar to the other short-term
investments they may make and to experience similar losses.  At the same time, small losses
to these depositors should not have major adverse consequences on the macroeconomy or
                                                                                                                                                                                     
increase losses (Kaufman and Seelig, 2002).
5 Under FDICIA, the FDIC may protect uninsured depositors and creditors if it receives permission to invoke the
systemic risk exemption on the basis that failing to protect these stakeholders “would have serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability” and doing so “would avoid or mitigate such adverse
effects” (FDICIA, 1991, p.43).  But such permission is considerably more difficult to receive and implement than
before 1991 (Kaufman, 2002).  The Depositor Preference Act of 1993 subordinated deposits at non-U.S. offices
and uninsured creditors to uninsured deposits at U.S. offices.8
ignite a chain reaction that leads to the failure of other banks.  Likewise, by not freezing
deposits, the money supply is not likely to be greatly reduced.
On the other hand, liquifying these deposits is likely to reduce the intensity of market
discipline by reducing the potential loss to affected depositors.
6  Thus, there is a tradeoff in
affecting expected losses from failure resolution between increased depositor discipline and
increased pressure for bailout. The longer the delay time in providing depositor access to the
value of their accounts, the greater is both the intensity of market discipline - decreasing
expected losses - and the pressure for bailouts - increasing expected resolution losses.   The
optimal time delay is given by the relative behavior of the two schedules as delay time
increases and occurs when the reduction in the expected loss from additional market discipline
exceeds the increase in expected loss from intensified bailout pressure by the greatest amount
(Kaufman and Seelig, 2002). If the market discipline schedule increases faster from the date
of resolution, the longest delay time is optimal in reducing expected losses.  If pressure for
bailout increases faster throughout, immediate access is optimal.  But delay time is a function
not only of FDIC policy with respect to these two factors, but also of the technical ability of
the FDIC to obtain the necessary data on deposit ownership and insurance eligibility and
estimated recovery value.  The rapid access frequently provided by the FDIC implicitly
reflects both the FDIC’s technical ability to obtain the required data and its perception that the
disadvantage of increased bailout pressure in increasing expected losses always or quickly
exceeds the advantage of increased market discipline in reducing these loses.
III  History of Depositor Treatment at Failed Banks
                                                          
6 A recent study of depositor behavior in Argentina, Chile and Mexico in the early 1990’s found that insured as
well as uninsured depositors disciplined riskier banks both by charging higher deposit rates and by withdrawing
deposits (Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  Among other possible reasons the authors note for this unexpected
behavior by insured depositors are potential delays in receiving payment.  Likewise, Demiriguc-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999)  report finding evidence of market discipline in a large number of countries that have
government provided safety-nets, but do not list delayed payments as one of the possible reasons.9
Reductions in depositor (or before that in noteholder) liquidity when banks fail have
been identified as a major costly problem almost from the very first bank failure.
7  Thus, as
Upham and Lamke (1934, p. 162) noted even in 1934 that:
it is perhaps surprising that it took so many years to find a
satisfactory means of expediting substantial initial payment to
depositors at closed banks [because] the desirability of such
procedure was early recognized.
An early suggestion of a potential solution to the problem is included among the questions
circulated by the National Monetary Commission  in 1908.  The Commission was established
by  the Congress in the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to inquire into the causes and implications of
the banking and financial crises of 1907 and earlier and to make recommendations for
improvements in the financial system.  It published a 20-volume report that included many
classic studies and the results of a 19 question questionnaire mailed to various representatives
of the U.S. banking industry.  Question 18 asked:
The response was highly favorable. Responses were obtained from 85 respondents.  Of these,
63, or some two-thirds, favored a change to pay depositors of closed banks more rapidly.  This
percent was the same among bankers and bank examiners, the two largest groups of
respondents.  Only 12 respondents, or 14 percent, were opposed to such a change and the
remainder either skipped the question or were undecided.
                                                          
7 Empirical support for the high cost of depositor illiquidity is provided for the period 1921 through 1940 in
Mason, Anari and Kolari (2000).
Would it be well, in your opinion, to change the existing laws so that
liquidating banks could, in some way, arrange to pay depositors more
rapidly?   A careful examination of the assets of failed banks will
frequently show about how much dividend they can eventually pay,
and considerable distress would be prevented if something
approximating this amount could be paid to depositors without any
delay (National Monetary Commission, 1910, p.8).10
The search for solutions to the illiquidity problem in bank failures increased in
intensity as the number of banks failing increased sharply after the start of the Great
Depression in 1929.  By the time it reached its nadir in 1933, nearly 10,000 commercial banks
or some 40 percent of the industry had failed.  Between 1865 and 1933, receiverships, during
which depositors were paid in installments as the assets were sold, lasted as long as 21 years
and averaged six years in length (FDIC, 1998b).  As a result, the loss of liquidity became an
increasingly important public policy concern.
In the early 1930s, before the enactment of deposit insurance in the U.S. in 1933,
Senator Carter Glass, a coauthor of the Federal Reserve Act and the influential chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee at the time, proposed more rapid payment to depositors at
failed banks as a superior alternative to deposit insurance, which he opposed (Bradley, 2000;
Bremer, 1935; Kennedy, 1973; and Willis and Chapman, 1934). Unlike federal government
deposit insurance, rapid payment to depositors was perceived as maintaining depositor
discipline to guard against loss in value. Willis and Chapman describe the objective of the
Glass proposal as follows:
The plan called for the establishment of a Federal Liquidating Corporation that would
estimate a bank’s recovery value immediately upon its failure, quickly sell the bank as a
whole or in parts, and quickly pay the proceeds to the receiver for speedy disbursement to the
Recognizing that in bank failures the source of difficulty and loss is not
primarily found in lack of assets, but…that the resources of depositors
are tied up and rendered unavailable for long periods…liquidation power
and not guaranty was demanded…insuring an almost immediate
settlement within a short time upon the basis of the estimated worth of
the [failed] bank’s assets…This plan was considered by the [Banking]
Committee entirely adequate to the protection of the bank depositor
against most of the evils to which he had been subject, while leaving him
still with a measure of individual responsibility for the protection of his
claims through the selection of a well-qualified bank. (Willis and
Chapman, 1934, pp. 65-67).11
depositors.  But this plan appears to have been found too difficult to implement, primarily
because it required more accurate estimates of the market value of the failed bank’s assets
than many believed possible at the time.
The advantages of such a scheme had also been seen by others.  For example, in 1931,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York attempted to have depositors at failed banks receive
the recovery value of their claims faster by requesting healthy member banks to buy the assets
of failed banks and advance the proceeds to them for immediate distribution (Bradley, 2000
and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  This proposal did not become operational.  But in 1933,
the New York State Banking Department was able to implement such an arrangement.  It
entered into agreements with the Manufacturers Trust Co. and other large New York City
commercial banks to serve as both liquidating and paying agents for a failed bank and
partially assume the deposits of the bank up to an agreed percentage of par amount (Upham
and Lamke, 1934).  The depositors would have access to this amount, sometimes within 24
hours of the time their banks were failed.  The assuming bank would be reimbursed from the
liquidation of the failed bank’s assets.  Charles Clough, Comptroller of Manufacturers Trust
noted the advantages of this program as follows:
In 1932, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act authorized the newly established
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to loan funds to banks closed for liquidation or
reorganization to enable them to make quick partial payments to depositors.  These loans were
Three things were definitely accomplished.  Business
men, whose working capital was frozen, were given relief
through the release of their bank balances, and at the same time,
were given immediate substantial banking connections which
would enable them to continue in business; apparent distress
among depositors was relieved at once; and the entire process of
liquidation was accomplished more expeditiously and
economically than was thought possible (Upham and Lamke, p.
76)12
securitized  by  the  failed banks’  assets.   As Jesse Jones,  long-time  chairman  of the RFC,
wrote  in  his memoirs,  these loans  would
The volume of such loans increased substantially after the national bank holiday in March
1933, when a large number of banks remained closed for some time or permanently.
  The freezing of the deposits at these banks was viewed as decreasing purchasing
power in the community and delaying recovery from the depression.  To expedite the
provision of funds for this purpose, President Franklin Roosevelt suggested a deposit
liquidation program “to stimulate and encourage liquidating agents of banks closed after
January 1, 1933 to borrow funds from the RFC in order that funds may be made available to
depositors as quickly as possible” (Upham and Lamke, 1934, pp. 168-169).
In part, because the RFC did not wish to operate such a program directly, Roosevelt
established a new Deposit Liquidation Board that could borrow from the RFC using the assets
of the closed banks as collateral.  The Board charged a lower interest rate on these loans than
the rate charged by the RFC and loaned on 80 percent of the liquidation value of the assets,
which was determined not on the basis of their current value but on values that the RFC
projected it could get in “an orderly liquidation period of three to five years in a recovering
stock and bond market” (Olsen, 1988, p. 75).  Although the volume of loans for this purpose
increased rapidly in 1933, the volume was still considered by some as too little and too slow
and a number of bills were introduced in Congress to have the Treasury or other federal
government agencies also advance funds to depositors at closed banks.  Despite gathering
considerable support, none of the bills were enacted (Calomiris and White, 1994).  Authority
…make at least a part of the depositor’s balance available to
him, pending liquidation.…We endeavored to lend up to the
probable liquidation value of  their [the bank’s] assets…The
government could afford to wait; often the individual could not.
(Jones, 1951, p. 39)13
to provide such loans was, however, included in the FDI Act, although apparently not used to
liquify frozen uninsured deposits until 50 years later in 1983.  With the sharp decline in the
number of bank failures after 1934, legislative interest in liqifying deposits at failed banks
diminished.
When the FDIC was established it paid insured deposits as promptly as it was
technically able.  In its Annual Report for 1934, it stated that:
Through time, the delay interval in paying the amount of insured deposits in deposit
payoff resolutions declined steadily.  The length of the interval between the date of closure
and the date of payment was published by individual resolution in the FDIC annual reports
from 1934 through 1980.  By 1940, the interval had been shortened to 10 to 14 days and by
the 1970s, to five to  seven days.  In 1980, the last time this information was published in the
annual report, the interval was only two to three days.  But, because these were calendar and
not business days, the term “immediate” used in the 1980 Annual Report appears appropriate.
Payments of the insured portion of depositors’ claims against the bank
which closed during 1934 were started promptly after the receiverships
began.  The interval between the appointment of the receiver and first
payment to insured depositors varied from 2 to 22 days, the average being
seven days.  Upon notification of suspension, preparations were begun for
payment of the insured deposits.  Before payment can be made an analysis
of the deposit liabilities of the closed bank is necessary.  Balances due to
depositors in the various classes of deposit accounts carried by the bank
must be brought together in one deposit liability register, in order that the
new insured deposit of each depositor in each right and capacity may be
determined, as required by law.  After the period in which the stockholders
might enjoin the State authorities from placing banks in liquidation had
expired, depositors were paid as rapidly as their claims we presented.
(FDIC, 1934, p. 26).14
On the other hand, until 1983, the few uninsured depositors that were not protected through
deposit assumption resolutions were paid through time as the receiver collected and
distributed the proceeds from the sale of the failed banks’ assets.
8
Insured deposits were paid more slowly than by the FDIC by both the former Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which insured S&Ls before the FDIC,
through the early 1960s and the states of Ohio, Maryland and Rhode Island, which
experienced the failure of a large number of relatively small, perceived state insured banks
and thrift institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Insured depositors in the latter institutions
were limited to withdrawing a maximum dollar amount per week or month (Kane, 1992 and
Pulkkinen and Rosengren, 1993).  Thus, these insured depositors suffered liquidity losses.
In 1983, as noted earlier, to strengthen depositor discipline, the FDIC began to require
uninsured depositors to share in the FDIC’s losses at more failed banks.  At the same time, to
reduce any liquidity loss to these depositors, the FDIC advanced dividends to them equal to a
conservative estimate of the pro-rata present value of the recovery amount.
9  T h i s  w a s
accomplished through a modified payoff procedure in which another bank assumed all the
insured deposits of the failed bank and a portion of the uninsured deposits (partial assumption)
depending on the value of the bank’s assets purchased and/or any payment to the bank by the
FDIC equivalent to the advance dividend (FDIC, 1983 and 1997 and Isaac, 1983).
Through time, the FDIC pursued a combined loss-sharing and advance dividend of
less than par value program on a stop-and-go basis.  This procedure was used in the resolution
                                                          
8  The medium-sized Penn Square Bank (Oklahoma City), which failed in 1982, was by far the largest bank to be
resolved by the FDIC with losses to uninsured depositors, when its large and uncertain off-balance sheet
contingent obligations made it difficult for the FDIC to sell the bank quickly. It was resolved through a deposit
payoff.  Uninsured depositors received receivership certificates.  Depository institutions that held these
certificates were able to value them immediately at 80 percent of their par value for regulatory purposes and at
90 percent as collateral for borrowing at the Fed discount window.  The FDIC, as receiver, began paying
liquidating dividends on the certificates in 1983.  It paid 55 percent of the value of the claims in the first two
years and terminated the receivership in 1996 after paying nearly 90 percent of the value of the claims on a
nonpresent value basis (FDIC, 1998a).15
of 13 smaller bank failures in 1983-84 and the FDIC issued an official request for public
comment on this strategy in 1985 (FDIC, 1985 and 1997 and Short, 1985).  But, the program
was halted when uninsured deposits were again fully protected at nearly all failures at the
Continental Bank and for some seven years thereafter.  The program was resurrected in March
1992 after the enactment of FDICIA in 1991 and effectively halted again after 1995. 
10
After being paid in 75 of 180 bank failures between 1992 and 1995, including in all six
failures in 1995, advance dividends were paid in only three of the 35 failures since then
through 2002 (Table 1).   The dividends were not paid in any of the largest four failures in this
period, possibly because of the FDIC’s difficulty in valuing their assets.  Significant fraud and
investment in exceptionally risky and complex assets contributed greatly to these failures, all
of which experienced unusually high loss to asset ratios.
11  Nevertheless, a policy of advance
dividends to uninsured depositors in an environment of small losses may well serve in place
of fuller deposit insurance as a means of reducing the damage from bank failures and
strengthening the financial system, as proposed more than 50 years earlier by Senator Glass.
IV.  Treatment of  Depositors in Other Countries
Both insured and uninsured depositors at failed banks are treated differently in most
countries than are their counterparts in the U.S.   Deposits at these banks are often frozen for
substantially long periods of time. Depositors at least for insured, who would incur no loss in
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Before depositor preference,  uninsured deposits and other  creditor  claims had equal priority and both received
equal treatment and advance dividends.    Since depositor preference,  advance dividends have been  restricted  to
uninsured depositors.
10 Section 416 of FDICIA grants the FDIC authority to make a quick final settlement payment to uninsured and
unsecured claimants based on its recent receivership recovery rate “to maintain essential liquidity and to prevent
financial disruption.”  Particularly in light of the large variance in losses it experienced in the relatively few post-
FDICIA failures, the FDIC has viewed this provision as less flexible and potentially more costly than the use of
advance dividends, which is tailored to the estimated loss of the individual bank, and has not used it.
11 On July 27, 2001, the FDIC resolved the Superior Bank FSB in Chicago.     With $2.3 billion in assets, it was
the largest institution resolved since the early-1990s.  The loss was estimated in excess of 25 percent.  At the date
of closure, some 1,000 depositors held $43 million in uninsured deposits.     Because the failure resulted from
major fraudulent   activities, the FDIC could not get a reasonably accurate estimate of the recovery value of the
assets quickly  and,  as a result, did not advance a dividend to the uninsured depositors.  They were to be paid as
the funds  were  collected  by  the FDIC,  serving as conservator.  The FDIC made a first payment of 32 percent
on March 12, 2002 and a second payment of 15 percent on May 28, 2002.16
par value but would incur liquidity losses from such delays, this is not necessarily the result of
only a deliberate policy to increase market discipline.   Rather, as was noted earlier, the delays
are also the result of the inability of the deposit insurer to obtain, process, and certify the
required information on the identity of the insured depositors and the amounts insured to
make accurate payments sooner.  This may be expected to vary from country to country.
Indeed, legal time constraints are frequently imposed to limit, not extend, the length of any
freezing of accounts.  For example, Article 10 of the Directive of the European Union dealing
with deposit-guarantee schemes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, requires that each
member country’s national insurance agency pay insured depositors “within three months of
the date on which the competent authorities make a determination” that the bank is unable to
repay its deposits in full and deposits become unavailable to the depositors.  But, this time
period may be extended for three three-month periods to a maximum of twelve months if
necessary in “exceptional circumstance.”  Likewise, in Canada, the Canadian Deposit
Insurance Corporation provided depositors of the failed Federation Trust Company in 1994
access to the insured portion of their deposits only 52 days after the bank was declared legally
failed, although faster advance payments were made in cases of critical need (Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 1994-95).
To obtain additional information on the deposit paying practices of other countries, the
FDIC surveyed 78 deposit insurers in 64 foreign countries in February 2000 on, among other
issues, the availability of funds to depositors after a bank has been declared insolvent and
differences in the treatment of insured and uninsured depositors. 
  The countries chosen were
those that had explicit deposit insurance schemes in place at the time. The responses of 30
countries that actually experienced bank failures since 1980 are analyzed here.
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12 Other aspects of the survey are analyzed in Bennett (2001).  A more complete analysis of this subsurvey
appears in Kaufman and Seelig (2002).17
Only three countries (Japan, Italy and Peru) provide for immediate payment of insured
deposits.   Five other countries gave insured depositors access to their funds within one month
of the failure. The large majority of all respondents attempted to give insured depositors
access within no more than three months.  Four countries delayed depositor access longer.
Although almost all of the respondents provided insured depositors with all their funds with a
delay, they generally paid the funds all at one time.  Only the deposit insurers in Italy, Austria,
Latvia and Peru paid in installments.
The survey results clearly show that the practice of advancing funds to uninsured
depositors at failed institutions is largely unique to the United States.  Twenty-three of the
respondents indicated that insured depositors cannot be fully protected in their country and
only three deposit insurers (Canada, Japan, and Slovakia) indicated that they had the power to
advance funds to cover uninsured depositors.  Unlike it has for insured deposits, the European
Union has no harmonizing directive covering payment to uninsured depositors or other
creditors.  This is left to the laws and regulations of the individual countries.
The timing of availability of funds to uninsured depositors is typically dependant on
the type of resolution. In countries, such as Italy and Brazil, uninsured depositors have
immediate access to their deposits if a resolution results in the transfer of the deposits to
another financial institution.  In most countries, unprotected depositors have to wait for the
liquidation process to yield sufficient cash for payments to be made to them.  The practices
surrounding the liquidation of assets and payment of claims follows the national practices for
corporate bankruptcy, with discretion being vested with the courts or the liquidator, receiver,
or administrator for the failed bank estate.  In all cases where the uninsured depositor were
dependent on a liquidation process for their proceeds, they received access to their funds in
installments.18
A review of the additional comments volunteered by the respondents on the survey
form suggests that, because most deposit insurers have no discretion to protect uninsured
depositors in liquidations or to advance funds from their deposit insurance funds to uninsured
depositors, they tend to use resolution strategies that fully protect uninsured depositors.  This
suggests that these countries are likely to resort to too big to fail type bailout resolutions
strategies when larger banks become insolvent that include partial or total nationalization of
the banks and/or extending blanket guarantees to the depositors and other creditors while the
insolvent banks continue in operation.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Losses in depositor liquidity appear to be a cause of adverse consequences of bank
failures, at minimum, equal in importance to losses in deposit credit value, and in many
countries far more important.  Insured, as well as uninsured, accounts at failed banks are often
partially or totally frozen until the receiver collects and distributes the proceeds from the sale
of the bank or its assets, which may take up to many years.  It follows that to reduce the
adverse effects of bank failures, it is generally important to reduce the magnitude and length
of depositor illiquidity.  In the United States, illiquidity does not appear to be a very
significant problem currently, but it was historically and still is in most other countries.  In the
U.S., the FDIC pays depositors the par amount of their insured deposits the next business day
after the bank is legally failed, generally on a Monday after a bank is failed on the previous
Friday.  Payment is generally at an assuming bank.  If the FDIC suffers no loss in the
resolution or when it protects all uninsured deposits in full, the FDIC also makes the full par
amount of the uninsured deposits available at the assuming bank.
 In more recent years, except in cases of massive fraud or unusually difficult to value
assets, the FDIC has frequently advanced a dividend to uninsured depositors at the same time
it compensates the insured depositors in an amount equal to a conservative estimate of the19
present value of the recovery amount.  Thus, depositor illiquidity is minimized.    If this is
achieved and if losses in deposit value are kept small through appropriate application of
prompt corrective action strategies, the FDIC is in a better position to resolve even large
insolvent banks efficiently with minimum pressure for protecting stakeholders from either the
stakeholders themselves or the government and helps to explain the successful introduction of
uninsured deposit loss- sharing resolutions in recent years.  That is, loss-sharing resolutions
are economically and politically easier when depositor liquidity is provided.  Indeed, one can
argue that a program to quickly liquify all deposits at failed banks is a prerequisite to
resolving insolvent banks efficiently with minimum social welfare loss.  Thus, it is surprising
that the FDIC has effectively stopped paying advance dividends to uninsured depositors in
bank failures since 1995.  The FDIC would do well to reactivate this program and to announce
it publicly as ongoing policy to reduce depositor fears of illiquidity in bank resolutions.
  The importance of deposit liquification at failed banks has been recognized in a
number of periods in the U.S. throughout, at least, the twentieth century and was even
proposed as a better behaving alternative to deposit insurance.  Short-lived experiments with
liquifying deposit accounts at failed banks were implemented in the early 1930s before the
introduction of deposit insurance, when bank failures were frequent, by both the RFC and
New York State Banking Commission.  But these programs were terminated when the number
of bank failures declined sharply after the Great Depression and the FDIC protected most
uninsured as well as all insured deposits and provided near immediate account access to them.
Only recently has the FDIC left uninsured deposits unprotected and been faced with the
liquification problem.
 But liquifying both insured and uninsured deposits at failed banks is less frequent in
most other countries both because of technical problems in quickly identifying the eligible
deposits and depositors and estimating the recovery values and because of the absence of20
legislation explicitly providing for payments in advance of recoveries.  As a result, political
and economic pressures often encourage governments in these countries to avoid failing large
insolvent banks and instead to maintain them in operation at a high long-term cost to their
economies.   Thus, if these countries were to introduce loss-sharing resolutions, they would
benefit from adopting advance dividend payments along the lines of the FDIC program in the
U.S. in the mid-1990s or, at minimum, encouraging the development of an efficient secondary
market in depositor receivership claims.21
Table 1












1992 120 35 29
1993 41 26 63
1994 13 8 62
1995 6 6 100
1996 5 2 0
1997 1 0 0
1998 3 0 0
1999 7 0 0
2000 6 1 17
2001 3 0 0
2002 10 0 0
TOTAL 215 78 36
Source: FDIC22
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